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In several circumstances, cooperation among autonomous agents is a
prerequisite for effective or efficient task processing. This stems from the
inherent or transient asymmetry of the agents’ resources and capabilities.
Since agents process tasks autonomously, they have to decide by themselves
under which conditions and to which means they cooperate. Such local deci-
sion making renders dedicated entities for resource management dispensable
and, thus, may increase the system’s fault-tolerance. In this report, we pro-
pose a framework for self-configuring resource management in cooperative
and uncooperative environments. Therefore, we recognize the relatedness of
autonomous agents and economic entities. Both are REMMs [1] and assess
their resources and demands locally which leads to more efficiency of the
overall system. We identify and discuss two dimensions of autonomy, i.e.
principal-agent and inter-agent autonomy. If all agents are part of the same
organization, inter-agent autonomy gives way to cooperating agents. We
elaborate distributed resource management for such cooperative systems.
In case of inter-agent autonomy, uncooperative agent behavior is encour-
aged by their REMM nature. Yet, we show that the presented concept
of resource management is seamlessly applicable to such an environment.
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An autonomous agent is designed, deployed, and maintained in order to
execute a set of specific tasks. The conception of the autonomous agent has
to take into account varying requirements and general conditions and, thus,
is likely to be a compromise. Therefore, in a network of autonomous agents,
it is probable that an agent A discovers another agent B in its vicinity
which is more specialized in a specific task. In such a case, it is highly
desirable that agent B executes the task on behalf of agent A since he is
able to do so more efficiently. For instance, a small gripper robot might
have to process a complex computation by himself if no other device is in its
vicinity, whereas, in the presence of a powerful computing device, it delegates
such a computation. Apart from ad hoc availability of such resources and
services, the inter-agent dependency may be volitional in conception, e.g., by
deploying a specialized agent for each task. In any case, cooperation among
autonomous agents is a prerequisite for effective or efficient task processing.
The major challenge for an autonomous agent consists in estimating
under which conditions cooperation becomes necessary and more resource
efficient than isolated task processing. Since the agents are autonomous,
they have to make the decision themselves according to their view of the
environment. Such local decision renders dedicated entities for resource
management dispensable. Furthermore, it may increase the system’s fault-
tolerance to agent failure and compromise.
Autonomous agents maximize their utility while minimizing resource
consumption. Apparently, the behavior of autonomous agents is closely
related to the one of economic entities. In economics, there are models
that capture such behavior, notably the Resourceful Evaluative Maximizer
Model (REMM) [1]. According to this model, each entity is resourceful
and evaluates means of maximizing its utility, i.e. satisfying its demands.
It is conjectured that overall resource consumption and service provision is
efficient if each entity acts according to REMM and cooperate on markets [2].
For a set of such entities, resource management is performed locally and,
thus, is self-configuring.
It seems promising to apply REMM to autonomous agents. Therefore,
agents must be capable of assessing resources and require a notion of utility.
Apparently, these requirements are contingent upon the agents’ autonomy.
The outline of this report is as follows: In Section 2, we examine dif-
ferent types of agent autonomy. For the special case of an isolated agent,
Section 3 describes the key concepts of resource management. The concept
is generalized in Section 4 by considering the potentials of cooperation. Still,
it is assumed that the agents are collectively subordinate to a common goal.
Therefore, in Section 5, we discuss resource management for agents that tend
to uncooperative behavior by maximizing their selfish utility. The practical
issue of efficiently brokering cooperation is approached in Section 6. We
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survey related work in Section 7 and, finally, in Section 8, we conclude the
report.
2 Dimensions of Autonomy
By referring to agents as autonomous, two different concepts are addressed.
On the one hand, each agent autonomously makes decisions and processes
tasks on behalf of its principal. On the other hand, agents might not depend
on other agents in order to fulfill their tasks. In this section, we take a closer
look at both dimensions of autonomy.
2.1 Principal-Agent Autonomy
Each agent is designed, deployed, and maintained by its principal, e.g., by
an organization. The principal defines the agent’s tasks and, in addition,
the principal makes its utility and general conditions explicit for the agent.
In this context, the agent’s autonomy ensues from making independent de-
cisions without consulting the principal. Yet, the agent’s decision is made
within the framework of the principal’s specification. Obviously, the speci-
fication’s accuracy is crucial for achieving the goals the principal aims at.
In contrast to human agents, an automated agent is designed by the
principal so that the utility functions of the principal and the agent do not
conflict. If the principal specifies its utility accurately enough, the agent may
even become a perfect agent [3]. In any case, the application of automated
agents eliminates agency costs. This insight is especially important for au-
tonomous agents because autonomy generally entails information asymme-
try. Take for instance a soldier (agent) the utility function of whom differs
from the one of his commander (principal), e.g., because of his risk aversion.
Without additional mechanisms that compensate for information asymme-
try (the commander has no complete knowledge of the soldier’s actions),
the agents are subject to adverse selection [4]. Yet, from an agency cost
perspective, information asymmetry ceases to be detrimental if the agent is
automated.
2.2 Inter-Agent Autonomy
The other dimension of autonomy becomes apparent for an agent that is able
to execute its tasks without relying on the help of other agents. Nevertheless,
this kind autonomy does not rule out inter-agent cooperation in order to
execute tasks more efficiently.
Regarding cooperation, two behavioral patterns are identifiable. On the
one hand, agents may be inherently motivated to cooperate, e.g., because
they act on behalf of the same principal. On the other hand, agents may
perceive cooperation solely as a means of maximizing their selfish utility [5].
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In such a case, they resemble economic entities and tend to be uncooperative
unless there is an added value of cooperation like remuneration. An agent
chooses its behavior with regard to the other agents. Take for instance the
agents A1 and A2 that are deployed by the same principal. They might
exhibit cooperative behavior, whereas, at the arrival of an agent B1 that is
deployed by another principal, A1 and A2 are uncooperative with regard to
B1 and vice versa.
3 Resource Management of an Isolated Agent
If an agent is isolated from its principal and other agents, it has to manage
its resources efficiently by itself. In this section, we discuss such isolated
resource management which builds the foundation for distributed resource
management in a network of agents.
In principle, it suffices that the principal specifies its utility function
and a set of general conditions. Then, the agent makes decisions by maxi-
mizing the utility while considering these conditions. However, an agent is
generally composed of several entities that process subtasks, so that global
maximization becomes complex or even infeasible. It seems more promis-
ing to subdivide utility optimization to the respective entities, which would
diminish the complexity of conceiving agents by rendering them more mod-
ular. For example, communicating agents require protocol entities in order
to run the protocol stack [5]. The very nature of such protocol entities con-
sists in abstracting from other entities’ tasks. Therefore, the conception of
an inter-entity utility maximization seems daunting. Nevertheless, the in-
terdependencies of consuming the device’s shared resources have to be made
explicit, as it is shown in [6].
We suggest resource assessment as the glue of entity level decision mak-
ing. If each entity is aware of the scarceness/preciousness of the respective
resources, it is able to adapt its resource consumption patterns in order
to execute its subtask accordingly. In this regard, the evaluative nature
of the entities is revealed, which is conform to them REMM model. Dur-
ing decision making, each entity is aware of several resource tradeoffs [7] so
that, the assessment of the respective resources given, it is able to determine
the most efficient way to process its subtask. For instance, such resource
tradeoffs are memory vs. computation/bandwidth (cache) and energy vs.
computation/movement (sleep). In conclusion, resource assessment specifies
behavior of the agent’s entities without inducing an explicit strategy choice
of such entities.
The notion of resource assessment may also be applied to the services
that an entity provides. Apparently, this becomes necessary if entities con-
sume added value services and, thus, are not aware of the resources they
implicitly consume. In such a case, each entity has to assess the value of the
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services that it provides by estimating the resources that it requires there-
for. Consequently, service assessment is derived from resource assessment
and may be treated accordingly. Therefore, in the following, we will focus
on resource assessment.
The principal determines the behavior of its agent’s entities by assessing
its resources. Resource assessment consists of a static and an adaptive part.
The principal statically assesses the scarceness of every resource regardless
of its transient usage. E.g. a sensor agent might be assigned high values
for its battery power. In addition, the principal assigns a value function
that introduces adaptivity to resource usage. Adaptivity is required with
respect to the availability of specific resources. For instance, resources of
heavily loaded agents become more expensive. More generally speaking, the
adaptivity of assessment takes the resources’ opportunity costs into account.
More advanced resource assessment strategies also take future circum-
stances into account. For example, when an autonomous agent departs
for an energy-intensive trip without opportunities of battery recharging,
it makes sense to anticipatorily increase the value of its energy resources.
Therefore, the agent requires dedicated entities that forecast future circum-
stances and adjust accordingly the principal’s static resource assessment.
4 Resource Management for Cooperative Agents
In general, an organization deploys several autonomous agents. If they are
within reach, their decision making has to take into account the opportu-
nity for cooperation. Regardless of the existence of inter-agent autonomy,
the agents might be well aware of their common principal and, thus, pay at-
tention to the other agents’ resource assessment. Therefore, in this section,
we apply the aforementioned concept of resource management to networks
of cooperative agents. The concept’s generalization by the means of distri-
bution makes its strong points evident.
The perception of an agent as a composition of entities renders the gen-
eralization to distributed resource management straightforward. Whether
the resources are remote or not, their assessment is considered as valid by
the consuming entity. Therefore, we assume that the agents are cooperative
in terms of valuing local and remote resource consumption equally. Take for
instance a gripper robot and a transmitter that are both able to establish
an earth link. The gripper robot does not possess dedicated hardware and
superfluous energy resources. Therefore, its link entity assesses its service
at 20 units, whereas the transmitter’s link entity assesses the same service
at 5 units. If the gripper robot requires the earth link, it will get known of
the transmitter’s assessments (see Section 6) and establish the link with its
help. Yet, if there is no transmitter in its vicinity, it might find it not worth
of consuming 20 units for such an earth link. The other way round, if the
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transmitter requires the link, it will not use the gripper robot’s link because
it is more valuable. The transmitter would exhibit different behavior, if it
is selfish and therefore is only concerned by the consumption of its own re-
sources. Section 5 examines resource management for such uncooperative
agents.
In conclusion, local resource assessment not only determines the behavior
the respective agent but also from the agents in its vicinity. Furthermore,
the proposed resource management is self-configuring and results in efficient
use of resources.
5 Resource Management for Uncooperative Agents
In a networks of autonomous agents, agents are not necessarily assigned by
the same principal or they might not be aware of it. Then, agent behavior is
solely contingent upon the consumption of its own resource and, thus, agents
become uncooperative. Without adjustment, the aforementioned resource
management concept would fail since, then, remote resources are for free
and their consumption is preferred. In this section, we refine the resource
management scheme for this purpose.
Uncooperative agents do not compare the scarceness of other agents’
resources with the benefits that arise from consuming them. Therefore,
the costs of consuming remote resources have to be incured locally on the
agent that initiates resource consumption. A straightforward solution of
localizing costs and utility consists of making the unit of resource assessment
explicit by the means of remuneration. Remunerating resource management
for networks of autonomous devices has been widely examined for ad hoc
networks [5].
If remuneration is solely subject to resource assessment, resource man-
agement does not differ from the one for cooperative agents (Section 4). Yet,
the relatedness of economic entities and autonomous agents yields a more
generic assessment of the remuneration. Let us assume that the providing
entity assesses its service inferior to the utility that the consuming entity
assesses to derive from it. Then, there exists a surplus that should be bar-
gained on [8]. If there is no surplus, cooperation does not materialize since
it would result in inefficient resource consumption. Apparently, efficient
resource management requires a means of efficiently discovering provider-
consumer pairs with a surplus to bargain on. This topic is discussed in the
next section.
6 Service Discovery and Resource Efficiency
An isolated agent has direct access to the assessment of resources since it is
performed locally. However, for distributed resource management, potential
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consumers have to discover agents that assess the respective resources infe-
rior to the utility that the consumer derives from them. Apparently, such
a discovery is not contingent upon the cooperativeness of the agents and,
thus, it is a prerequisite for the resource management of both Section 4 and
Section 5.
Existing approaches of decentralized service discovery for autonomous
agents [9][10][11][12] apply overlays in order to route efficiently the providers’
service advertisements and the consumers’ service requests. It seems promis-
ing to couple such a service discovery with resource and utility assessment.
In the following, we examine such a coupling in the presence of static and
dynamic assessment.
6.1 Discovery in the Presence of Static Assessment
The basic concept of making service discovery aware of resource and util-
ity assessment consists of including them into the description of discovery
messages, i.e. advertisements and requests. Therefore, service assessment
is added to advertisements, whereas requests comprise utility assessment.
Consequently, matching requests to advertisements has to take both assess-
ments into account.
If both resource and utility assessment are static, such an extension of
service discovery suffices in order to efficiently establish consumer-provider
pairs. Nevertheless, resource management is rendered more efficient if the
difference between resource and utility assessment is maximized. Even for
uncooperative agents, both the consumer and the provider take advantage
of such a surplus maximization.
Obviously, discovery overlays should exploit the semantics of assessment
in order to become more efficient. For example, if the advertisements of two
equivalent services have to be dispersed in the overlay, it might suffice to
disperse the service that is assessed at a lower value.
6.2 Discovery in the Presence of Dynamic Assessment
On the one hand, dynamic resource assessment arises from the adaptivity
of the value function and the anticipatory assessment. On the other hand,
dynamic utility assessment inherently stems from the transient demands of
the agents. Hence, in most scenarios, service discovery has to take into
account dynamic assessment of resources and utilities.
Yet, the extension of service discovery as applied for static assessment
might still be applicable. If the discovery overlay privileges one type of dis-
covery messages, e.g., by caching them, the unprivileged message type may
be subject to dynamic assessment. For instance, current discovery over-
lays [9] privilege service advertisements by caching them in specific nodes of
the discovery overlay. In such a case, service requests are processed instantly
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so that dynamic utility assessment does not pose any problems. However, if
resource assessment is more dynamic than utility assessment, it would make
more sense to privilege service requests. Consequently, discovery overlays
should be contingent upon the respective assessment profile.
If neither resource nor utility assessment are static, the aforementioned
extension of service discovery has to be altered. Service advertisements may
contain a lower bound for the assessment of the respective service. In gen-
eral, such a lower bound is obtained by assuming that the required resources
lie idle. Apart from adding such necessary conditions to advertisements and
requests, an estimation of the assessment’s volatility, e.g. by the means of
probability distributions, has to be included in order to increase the chances
of finding the most efficient provider-consumer pair.
In case of extremely volatile assessment, any extension of service dis-
covery is doomed. Yet, this is matched with the inherent inefficiencies of
discovery overlays for extremely volatile topologies.
7 Related Work
Agoric computing [13] suggests efficient resource allocation and consumption
by the means of pricing mechanisms. In analogy to economics, it is argued
that local decision making and pricing induce efficiency. Agoric computing
requires a non-tamperable operating system that enforces market rules, e.g.
property rights of resources, and asserts the entities’ integrity, i.e. their
encapsulation. However, agoric computing applies market mechanisms in
order to prune efficient entities. The granularity of entities is not defined
a priori yet it emerges with respect to the tradeoff between transaction
costs and monolithic inefficiencies. As a result, agoric computing assumes
uncooperative entities so that pricing cannot be reduced to its signalling role,
as it is done for cooperative agents. In addition, the set of assessed resources
is known a priori since service assessment is not part of the operating system.
Resource tradeoffs and means of resource substitution are explicitly con-
sidered by introducing resource classes [2]. In this context, the storage
hierarchy yields distinct resource classes that reflect the tradeoff between
access time and storage price. In [14], this principle is transferred to band-
width in infrastructured WLANs. On the one hand, the stable allocation
(SA) class allows for streaming communications. On the other hand, the
instant allocation (IA) class offers a best effort service. Mobile devices no-
tify their respective access point about their priorities with respect to the
resource classes. The paper shows that, the tradeoff of stability (SA) and
throughput (IA) given, the mobile devices choose the class that suits best
to their service consumption profile. However, the approach encourages lav-
ish behavior since there is no incentive to refrain from allocating when no
bandwidth is required.
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The aforementioned approaches require entities that enforce the pricing
mechanisms. In agoric computing, the non-tamperable operating system
takes on this task, whereas, in infrastructured WLANs, the access point
enforces efficient bandwidth allocation and counters misbehavior of mobile
devices. In our resource management approach, enforcing entities are only
required for uncooperative agents. E.g., built-in security modules allow for
the distribution of such an enforcement [5].
For cooperative entities, pricing mechanisms have already been sug-
gested, e.g., in network pricing [15] among other things for load balancing.
However, in the context of autonomous agents, the concept of assessment be-
comes even more attractive because it reduces the complexity of autonomous
decisions, as pointed out in Section 3.
8 Conclusion
Agents process tasks autonomously so that they have to decide by themselves
under which conditions and to which means they cooperate in order to assert
efficient resource consumption. Such local decision making is self-configuring
and may increase the system’s fault-tolerance. Therefore, in this report, we
recognized the relatedness to the REMM model of economic entities. We
pointed out that there are two dimensions of agent autonomy. Both induce
varying behavioral patterns of the agent. We proposed and elaborated a
resource management approach for networks of autonomous agents. It is
based on local resource and utility assessment. We showed that the approach
is seamlessly applicable to uncooperative agents by introducing the notion of
remunerations. Finally, we examined the coupling of decentralized discovery
and our resource management scheme. It appears that, for most scenarios,
it may be efficiently integrated into the discovery framework.
We currently work on such an extension of our discovery overlays [9][11][12]
in order to take into account the discussed extensions of service discovery.
More specifically, we aim at including static assessment, bounds, volatility
and assessment profiles into the discovery mechanisms.
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